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The Supreme Court of the United States has recently had before it on writ
of error the suit originally begun by the United States Attorney for the Dis-
trict of Kansas, against Henry Hopkins and other residents of Kansas. and
members of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange. The purpose of the suit
was to obtain a dissolution of the exchange and to perpetually enjoin its mem-
bers from entering into, or from continuing in any combination of like char-
acter. The action was founded upon the Anti-Trust Act of 18go. and in the
bill it was alleged that the exchange had adopted certain rules governing its
members, the effect of which was in restraint of trade and commerce between
the States; that it was the- purpose of the defendants in organizing the ex-
change and adopting the rules to prevent the shipment or consignment of any
live stock to the Kansas City market unless consigned to the Kansas City stock
yards. and to some one or other of the defendants, members of the exchange,
and to compel these shippers from other States and Territories to paythem cer-
tain commissions, or be prevented from putting their property on sale at the
Kansas City market. The Court passed over the invalidity of the agreement
not to transact business with non-members as not coming before it for decis-
ion unless it was found that the defendants were engaged in interstate com-
merce. This the Court found in the negative, holding that their business was
more in the nature of a service collateral to interstate commerce, and rather
a local aid or facility provided for the cattle owner towards selling his cattle.
This was not altered by the fact that they sent agents throughout different
States to solicit cattle to be sent to them to be sold. The members of the
exchange did not buy the cattle, nor did they transport them, but only
engaged to sell them. Even granting that the cattle themselves,
coming from different States, were articles of interstate commerce, "it
does not follow that before their sale, all persons performing services with
them are themselves engaged in that commerce, or that their agreements
among each other relative to the compensation to be charged for their service
are void as agreements made in restraint of interstate commerce." The Court
further pointed out that even though it be true the charge of the agents on
account of service rendered, and the commission for selling the cattle, may
indirectly, and as an incident, enhance the cost to the owner of the cattle in
finding a market, or may add to the price paid by the purchaser, "they are
not charges which are directly laid upon the article in course of transpor-
tation, and which are charges upon the commerce itself." They are charges
for facilities givein or provided the owner in finding a market for his cattle.
The Court further said: " The contract condemned by the Statute is one
whose direct and immediate effect is a restraint upon that kind of trade or
commerce which is interstate. Charges for such facilities as we have already
mentioned are not a restraint upon that trade, although the total cost of market-
ing a subject thereof maybe thereby increased. Charges for facilities furnished
have been held not a regulation of commerce, even when made for services
rendered,-or as compensation for benefits conferred." &rnels v. Itmproeav en
Co., 123 U. S. 288, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 113; MAononghc'1a ..V,w. Co. v. U. S.
148 U. S. 312, 329, 330; Kentucky &. L Bria ge Co. v. L. &. X. Ry., 37 Fed.
567.
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As predicted in the JOURNAL (VOl. 7. p. 44), the Supreme Court of New York
has declared the law of that State which provides that convict-made goods
shall not be sold or kept for sale in that State except the same be labeled "con-
vict-made," to be unconstitutional, as violative of both the State and Federal
Constitutions, and that a section of the Penal code providing a penalty for ex-
posing convict-made goods for sale, except they be labeled ormarked 'convict-
made," to be void for the same reason. The main grounds for the decision
were that it operated as a burden or restriction upon interstate commerce. The
case goes further than Peofile v. Hawkins (85 Hun. 43). wherein a similar Stat-
ute. but which applied only to convict-made goods of other States, was held to be
unconstitutional because an interference with interstate commerce. The pres-
ent case, therefore, which holds that the act is not saved by the fact that it
applies to all States alike, including the State enacting it, removes the doubt
which arose after the above decision in that State as to whether this class of
legislation was unconstitutional merely because it discriminated against the
convict-made goods of other States Interstate commerce cannot be restricted
by a State law, even though operating wholly within its own jurisdiction, and
it is immaterial whether this restriction is under the guise of a law requiring
a municipal license to sell certain goods, or a health law requiring inspection
of the article, or a label law requiring the article to be branded. On the argu-
ment that it was a proper police regulation to protect the laboring classes from
competition with prison labor, the Court said that no Court had as yet invoked
the police power, broad as it is, in aid of a Statute, the purpose of which
was to enhance the wages of labor in certain factories by suppressing. through
the agencies of the criminal law, the sale of competing products made in
prisons. To do so would impliedly give the Legislature power to interfere in
all cases to help those who need help at the expense of those who do not. which
would clearly be unconstitutional.
The State of Ohio had a Statute in all essential particulars similar to the
New York Statute. and which was declared unconstitutional about a year ago.
Arnold v. Yander, 47 N. E. Rep. 5o.
A decision was rendered in what is known as the Joint Traffic Association
Case, by the Supreme Court of the United States, on the 24th ult. The de-
cision in effect affirms the case of the U. S. v. Trans-Mfissouri Freight
Association, decided about a year ago, in which it was held that combinations
of railways, formed for the purpose of maintaining rates, are illegal under
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of i89o. and in contravention of the Interstate
Commerce Act of x887. In the present case the main contention was that the
traffic agreement is a combination to prevent competition, and thus in
restraint of trade. The only new point raised and not decided in the Trans-
Mi issouri case was the constitutionality of the Anti.Trust Act. This the
Court decided in the affirmative, basing its conclusion upon the quasi public
character of public corporations, which gives Congress constitutional power
to deal with them and regulate them, as provided by the Act. The question
as to the policy of Congress in adopting such a measure was also brought up,
but this was held to be a matter with which the Court could have nothing to do.
The decision was rendered by Justice Peckham, as it was in the Trans.
Missouri case, and was concurred in by Chief Justice Fuller, and Justices
Harlon, Brewer and Brown. Justices Gray, Shiras and White dissented,
while Justice McKenna took no part, because when the action was begun he
was Attorney-General.
